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ABSTRACT: Patent thickets are unintentionally dense webs of overlap-
ping intellectual property rights owned by different companies that can
retard progress. This article begins with a review of existing research on
patent thickets, focusing in particular on the problem of patent thick-
ets in nanotechnology, or nanothickets. After presenting visual evidence
of the presence of nanothickets using a network analytic technique, it
discusses potential organizational responses to patent thickets. It then
reviews the existing research on patent pools and discusses pool forma-
tion in the shadow of antitrust enforcement. Based on recent research on
patent pool formation, it examines the divergent fate of two recent pools
and discusses the prospects for the future formation of nanotechnology
patent pools, or nanopools.
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INTRODUCTION
Nanotechnology is poised to be the first major technological revolution of
the 21st century, yet there is a growing concern that future innovation and
commercialization will be inhibited by the explosive rate of nanotechnology
patenting and the potential for the formation of patent thickets. These dense
webs of overlapping intellectual property rights owned by different companies
(Shapiro 2000) can present a significant barrier that must be hacked through
in order to commercialize new technology. In other industries characterized by
cumulative innovations and multiple blocking patents, the existence of such
densely concentrated patent rights can have the perverse effect of stifling in-
novation rather than encouraging it. Such patent thickets are already problem-
atic in other convergent technology areas such as biotechnology (Heller and
Eisenberg 1998; Clark et al. 2000; Horn 2003) and information technology
(Clarkson 2004).
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Progress in the field of nanotechnology has been rapid over the past half
century, with laboratories in corporations and universities researching the abil-
ity to successfully create working objects at this level. From 1985 until 2005,
there were 3818 nanotech patents issued in the United States, with an addi-
tional 1777 outstanding patent applications published since 2001 (Lux 2005).
This number is expected to increase exponentially as the processes required to
create such technologies are further developed over the next several decades.
Nanotechnology is a quickly growing area, and has the possibility for revo-
lutionizing a vast array of different fields and industries, including health care,
electronics, pharmaceuticals, and others. According to Lux Research (2003)
study, public and private companies spent $3 billion worldwide on nanotechnol-
ogy. This spending only shows signs of increasing over the next several years.
Given this level of spending, developing a strategy to deal with the problem
of nanothickets is critical, not only to the researchers developing these new
technologies but also the corporations and institutions that fund them. Without
appropriate strategies, firms will be unable to capitalize on their investments,
and researchers may be prevented from conducting even the most basic re-
search because nanothickets constitute such a potentially imposing obstacle.
While nanotechnology as a scientific domain has a number of unique at-
tributes that render it particularly susceptible to the development of patent
thickets, the problem of patent thickets is not new. Over the last century
and a half, organizations in technology industries attempting to advance
their innovative activities have often stumbled into patent thickets (Clarkson
2004). Although the organizational responses varied widely, certain orga-
nizations have occasionally responded by constructing patent pools or or-
ganizational structures where multiple firms collectively aggregate patent
rights into a package for licensing, either among themselves or to any po-
tential licensees irrespective of membership in the pool. Such collaboration
among technologically competing firms, however, has often encountered dif-
ficulty from an antitrust standpoint, even if the formation of the pool is
procompetitive.
THE PROBLEM OF NANOTHICKETS
A patent does not guarantee the right to make or do anything. Instead, a patent
gives the patent owner the right to exclude others from making, using, or selling
anything that embodies the technology covered by the patent. When a given
organization has all of the necessary patents to develop a given technology,
it can proceed without intellectual property entanglements. When multiple
organizations each own individual patents that are collectively necessary for
a particular technology, however, their competing intellectual property rights
form a “patent thicket” (Clarkson 2005).
The problem of patent thickets has recently caught the attention of much
of the scientific and engineering community in a number of technological
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arenas (Heller and Eisenberg 1998; Merges 1999; Clark et al. 2000;
Newberg 2000; Shapiro 2000; FTC 2002, 2003; Gilbert 2002; Glover 2002;
Horn 2003; Lerner et al. 2003; Clarkson 2004, 2005). For example, firms in the
semiconductor industry “find it all too easy to unintentionally infringe on a
patent in designing a microprocessor, potentially exposing themselves to bil-
lions of dollars of liability and/or an injunction forcing them to cease pro-
duction” (Shapiro 2000, p. 121). Heller and Eisenberg (1998) lament the “an-
ticommons” in biomedical research due to the problem of patent thicketing.
Particularly in the biopharmaceutical industry, patent thickets threaten the pro-
cess of cumulative innovation because they act “as barriers to entry [that prevent
new entrants] from using the technologies protected by such patent thickets”
(Glover 2002, p. C10).
A recent FTC (2003) report notes that in certain industries the large number
of issued patents makes it virtually impossible to search all the potentially rele-
vant patents, review the claims contained in each of those patents, and evaluate
the infringement risk or the need for a license. For the software industry the re-
port cites testimony about the hold-up problems and points out “that the owner
of any one of the multitude of patented technologies constituting a software
program can hold up production of innovative new software” (2003, ch. 2, p.
3). For many firms, the only practical response to this problem of unintentional
and sometimes unavoidable patent infringement is to file hundreds of patents
each year to have something to trade during cross-licensing negotiations. In
other words, the only rational response to the large number of patents in a given
field may be to contribute to it.
The nanotechnology patent space experiences an even greater level of these
problems because it is much more complicated than other technology areas.
Because nanotechnology by definition encompasses a broad class of systems
and materials, searching for nanotechnology-related publications and patents
can be difficult, relative to other fields (Bawa 2004). Part of the complexity
relates to the fact that nanotechnology spans a wide variety of already estab-
lished fields. Because nanotechnology can be used in biomedical applications,
the patent for a particular innovation may fall into the realm of biomedical
patents. Likewise, a patent may be related to other such fields and classified
in those fields. The present global patent classification systems are not suf-
ficiently descriptive or designed to allow for the many unique properties that
are inherent in nanotechnology innovations.
One study found that approximately 3700 patents issued between 2001 and
2003 contained one or more of several nanotechnology-related terms (Sampat
2004). These patents span 200 different US patent classes and were examined
by 794 unique primary patent examiners; this last number is approximately
one-quarter of the patent examiners employed by the United States Patent and
Trademark Office (PTO) over this time period. As a result, a diverse group
of examiners from a wide variety of backgrounds examined nanotechnology
patent applications rather than examiners who could focus on nanotechnology
attributes.
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In order to address concerns stemming from the influx of new applications
based on nanotech, the PTO announced in October 2004 that it had created
a new classification for nanotechnology, Classification 977. This new clas-
sification defines nanotechnology very narrowly, however. According to the
PTO, Class 977 provides for disclosures that are “(i) related to research and
technology development at the atomic, molecular or macromolecular levels,
in the length of scale of approximately 1–100 nanometer range in at least one
dimension; and (ii) that provides a fundamental understanding of phenomena
and materials at the nanoscale and to create and use structures, devices, and
systems that have novel properties and functions because of their small and/or
intermediate size.”1
The creation of this new patent class did not solve the examiner problem
identified by Sampat (2005), however, as a 2005 study of Class 977 by ETC
Group notes that over 290 different primary patent examiners were assigned
to evaluate the various Class 977 patents. This incredibly large number of ex-
aminers raises the concern that overlapping and conflicting patents could have
been issued by different examiners at about the same time, with no knowledge
of other such events occurring. The problem with granting such patents is ob-
vious: if two companies with overlapping or conflicting patents unknowingly
go to market with products based on these patents, it is likely that neither would
have a claim superseding the other, leading to negative economic consequences
to both firms. As such, the granting of those patents is in neither company’s
interest.
One patent examiner noted that while the creation of Class 977 is a note-
worthy step, “it should be viewed as a starting point in a much larger effort
to ensure that patent law develops smoothly with regard to nanotechnology.”
(Mouttet 2005, p. 260). Because many of the search terms used in the study by
Sampat do not actually use the term “nanotechnology,” it is very possible that
those patents would be wholly assigned to different classifications where over-
lapping may occur. For example, patent thickets of overlapping patents may
already be in place, given that a patent claiming a carbon nanotube would po-
tentially conflict with similar patent applications claiming either carbonaceous
cylinders or elongated cylinders. Although the recent formation of patent class
977 for Nanotechnology coupled with training for examiners in nanotechnol-
ogy terminology and concepts may ameliorate the patent thicketing problem
somewhat, ultimately innovators will still be forced to hack their way through
these ever-burgeoning patent thickets. Because of these issues, the opportu-
nity for collaboration and discussion between examiners on nanotechnology
concerns is limited compared to other fields for which the PTO has instituted
primary classification.
Related to the difficulties with classification of nanotechnology patents are
the obstacles faced when searching the vast database of patents, a necessary
step in both applying for patents as well as in prosecuting them. Due to the sheer
1 Available at http://www.PTO.gov/go/classification/uspc977/defs977.htm
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volume of material necessary to search through when conducting searches in
the patent landscape, the utilization of automated techniques are necessary in
order to comb through the variety of patents that have been filed. Zucker and
Darby (2005) discussed one such way that nanotechnology research could be
captured via NanoBank, although this proposal is more focused on the problem
of overlapping research than on overlapping patents. As a result, this technique
and other automated techniques are not effective when searching for “prior art”
claims in nanotechnology due to the lack of a unified classification scheme
for nanotech (Bawa 2004).
Another concern with the secondary nature of classifying nanotechnology
in a patent application involves the possibility for applicants to author their
applications so that specific nanotech terminology is omitted. Such omissions
may be justified in order to prevent competitors from having access to key
parts of the innovation with the expectation that the competitors would not be
able to gain access to the knowledge that led to the invention.
A further problem with the new classification as a secondary classification
leads directly to other problems with protections and prosecutions. The nan-
otech field lacks a standard terminology with which to describe the inventions
in the nanotechnology sphere, leading to important difficulties in patenting
these inventions (Molenda 2004). In many fields and industries, both techni-
cal and common terms are used in certain ways specific to that field in order
to advance the understanding of various concepts in that field or industry. Be-
cause nanotechnology is such a relatively new field, the unique terminology
has neither been established nor standardized; as a result, it may be difficult for
applicants, examiners, and courts to understand the specific meanings behind
the terminology used to describe these patents.
In his article on the importance of defining terminology in the nanotech-
nology field, Molenda (2004) discusses various notable cases in which such
terminology was vital to the decision. In one court case addressing the question
of terminology, the Court of Appeals for the Federal Circuit (CAFC)2 stated
that the terms in a patent claim “bear a ‘heavy presumption’ that they mean
what they say and have the ordinary meaning that would be attributed to those
words by persons skilled in the relevant art.”3 Importantly, the CAFC indicated
that it should derive the “ordinary meaning” of claim terms from dictionaries,
encyclopedias, and treatises.4
As Molenda points out, however, while the court should look to such ref-
erence sources to ascertain the meanings of the various terms used in patent
applications, the definitions of the terms can vary widely. One such difference
is illustrated by the variations in the definition of the word “crystal.” Whereas
Webster’s II New Riverside Dictionary gives a relatively simple definition of
2 The CAFC has exclusive jurisdiction over appeals involving patents.
3 Texas Digital Systems, Inc. vs. Telegenix, Inc., 308 F. 3d 1193, 1202 (2002).
4 308 F.3d at 1202-03.
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the term, the McGraw-Hill Encyclopedia of Science and Technology, published
the year after the Webster edition, provides a much more technical definition
of the term.5 The interpretation of this term would depend greatly upon which
definition the court found to carry more weight within the scope of the partic-
ular patent in question. As a result, the lack of standardized technology within
the field of nanotechnology could produce an element of uncertainty in patent
prosecution that would not exist otherwise.
This difficulty is mitigated should the patent applicant define the terminol-
ogy within the application itself. In one case involving an applicant who had
included a lexicon of terminology within the application, the court looked to
this lexicon in reaching an understanding of the terms in question.6 As a re-
sult, applicants interested in the legal implications of a particular application
should seek to define the terms employed in the application as clearly as possi-
ble to ensure that these terms are not misconstrued by either the patent court or
competitors looking to appropriate the technology, thus avoiding unnecessary
economic harm resulting from an unsuccessful patent prosecution.
The Constitutional mandate under which the PTO operates was designed
to encourage innovation by inventors by providing short-term protection so
that the inventor may develop the product in a reduced-competition environ-
ment. In return for this protection, the inventor agrees to make the application
public so that others with interests related to the patent may improve upon
the invention in the future. The field of nanotechnology is so dynamic that
it presents distinctive problems. As Lemley (2005) discussed, the building
blocks of so-called “enabling” technologies—computer software, hardware,
the Internet, and biotechnology, among others—were left unpatented in ear-
lier fields of invention. According to Darby and Zucker (2003), while patents
are important for protecting particular biotechnology products, natural exclud-
ability provided important informal protection by slowing the dissemination of
the requisite knowledge. Such is not the case in nanotechnology where firms
and universities are looking to patent as much as possible as soon as possible
(Lemley 2005).
IDENTIFYING NANOTHICKETS
So how has the rush to patent nanotechnology affected the patent land-
scape for nanotechnology? Although Clarkson’s (2005) methodology for patent
5 Page 169 of Webster’s II New Riverside (Rev. ed. 1996) defines “crystal” as “A 3-dimensional
structure made up of atoms, molecules or ions arranged in basic units that are repeated throughout
the structure.” McGraw-Hill Encyclopedia of Science & Technology 630 (8th edition 1997) defines
“crystal” as “A solid in which the atoms or molecules are arranged periodically. .. In scientific nomen-
clature, the term crystal is usually short for single crystal, a single periodic arrangement of atoms. ..
In electronics the term is usually restricted to mean a single crystal which is piezoelectric.”(emphasis
added).
6 3M Innovative Properties Co. vs. Avery Dennison Corp., 350 F.3d 1365 (Fed. Cir. 2003).
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thicket detection is not yet fully applicable because no nanotechnology patent
pools exist to evaluate, such mechanisms for mapping the patent space and
identifying patent network density can still be applied because the nanotech-
nology patents and citations are available.
Clarkson’s measure is derived from the standard network analytic measure of
density. Social Network Analysis is a methodology developed by sociologists
and organizational theorists to examine the social structure of groups. In this
type of analysis, individuals are identified as the actors in a network, and
the relationships between those actors identified are identified as ties. If the
relationship from actor A to actor B can be different from the relationship from
actor B to actor A, the network is referred to as a directed network (or directed
graph).
While social network analysis, as a science, has been most commonly applied
to describe complex dynamics in human interaction, the underlying theory and
methodology is not limited to interpersonal relationships. Network analysis
describes the relationships among nodes, be they people, computers, power
stations, academic papers, or patents. Existing network analytic research in
other areas of information sciences has concentrated on patterns of citation in
literature and research (Price 1965, 1976; Redner 1998), and Newman (2000,
2001) has written extensively on the analysis of coauthorship networks within
academic communities and scholarly publishing. Patents share many similar
characteristics—citation practices in particular—to academic works, and that
research is quite relevant. Patent space as an information network bears signif-
icant similarity to academic citation networks based on temporal limitations
that specifically affect the directionality of linking vectors within a network.
Similar to academic papers, a new entrant can only give citation to previous
research or “prior art.” Because of this linear path, patents that give rise to in-
creased innovation can be seen as significant in creating lineages or families of
technologies—possibly the seeds from which a patent thicket grows (Freeman
1979).
Previous work has demonstrated the methodological validity of using net-
work analysis on patents. In an early study of patent networks, Podolny and
Stuart (1995) developed the concept of a “technological niche” that included
a focal innovation, the innovations on which the focal innovations built, the
innovations that built upon the focal innovation, and the technological ties
among the innovations within the niche. Using patents as the network nodes
and patent citations as the network ties between nodes, they then were able to
measure characteristics of innovation niches within the semiconductor indus-
try to determine how subsequent innovations may or may not build upon the
focal innovation. Those same authors used similar techniques in two subse-
quent articles. One article examined the evolution of technological positions
among firms (Stuart and Podolny 1996), and the other examined organizational
survival within technological niches (Podolny et al. 1996).
Not only did these early studies establish the methodological validity of ap-
plying network analytic techniques to patent networks in general, but much
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of their analysis of technological niches and competitive crowding was also
based on a variation of network density, a fundamental network analytic con-
cept (Marsden 1990; Wasserman and Faust 1994). As part of a study of patent
thickets in electronics and medical devices, Clarkson made certain necessary
modifications for the temporal constraints of patent networks. He also devel-
oped a modified density calculation for the patent space in order to examine
patent thickets and calculate patent thicket densities and was able to demon-
strate that patent thickets are objectively differentiable from the surrounding
patent universe (Clarkson 2005).
To visualize the growing patent thicket in nanotechnology, we began by
downloading front-page data for all of the patents issued since 2000 from the
PTO’s ftp site. We then searched the patent abstracts using the terms listed
in TABLE 1 and identified 2998 nanotechnology patents issued between Jan-
uary 1, 2000 and December 31, 2004. Using an automated XML parser, we
were able to extract the intragroup citations for the downloaded nanotechnol-
ogy patents. In order to visualize the growth of the patent thicket, we utilized
some of the network analytic techniques have been applied to patent spaces for
purposes of visualization. Force-directed placement techniques (Fruchterman
and Reingold 1991) have been used to present arrangements identifying com-
plex information spaces (Schroeder 1999), and Clarkson (2005) previously
incorporated this technique into a network analytic computational
methodology for mapping patent space and visually identifying patent
thickets.
To represent the temporal nature of nanothicket growth, we generated a series
of graphs for each year of our data set. FIGURE 1 illustrates the relationships
between patents in the nanotechnology space for the years 2000, 2002, and
2004. Each point in the figure represents one patent, and the edges denote a
reference made by one patent to another in the space.
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A report by Lux Research (2005) indicates that there may be multiple nan-
othickets, covering three separate platform technologies: dendrimers, quantum
dots, and carbon nanotubes. According to their report, fullerenes and nanowires
seem less crowded. Given the presence of ever increasing nanothickets cov-
ering at least three of five fundamental nanotechnology platforms, however,
the logical next question would be what should firms do in response to the
presence of nanothickets?
PATENT POOLS
Patent thickets are not a new phenomenon, and when the total number of
owners of the conflicting intellectual property rights is small, the response
to the patent thicket problem has often been to cross-license (Grindley and
Teece 1997; Teece 1998, 2000). When more than two parties are involved,
however, the transaction costs of cross-licensing between all of the parties can
be prohibitive, and additional economic barriers exist such as hold-ups and
double marginalization (Viscusi et al. 2000). In response to these challenges
throughout the last 150 years, organizations have attempted to solve the mul-
tiparty patent thicketing problem by constructing patent pools. Usually, each
firm assigns or licenses its individual intellectual property rights to a specific
entity that in turn exploits the collective rights by licensing, manufacturing,
or both. Different licensing arrangements are then available, depending on
whether the licensee is a member of the pool and how the resulting royalties
are subsequently distributed among the members of the pool.
While even the PTO has suggested patent pooling as a solution to the patent
thicketing problem (Clark et al. 2000), the cooperative formation of patent
pools by technologically competing firms has often encountered difficulty
from an antitrust standpoint, even if the pool itself has procompetitive benefits.
While the antitrust and intellectual property regimes were frequently in tension
for most of the 20th century, with patent pooling often facing rather aggressive
antitrust enforcement even in situations where the pool was procompetitive,
recent developments indicate, however, that these two areas of law can be
aligned so as to foster rather than stifle innovation. The 1995 Guidelines for
the Licensing of Intellectual Property (IP Guidelines), jointly issued by the
US Department of Justice (DOJ) and the Federal Trade Commission (FTC),
formally acknowledged that collective ownership structures for intellectual
assets, including patent pools, could potentially be procompetitive solutions to
the patent thicket problem.
Although the revenues generated from sales of devices based in whole or in
part on patent pool technologies are at least $100 billion US per year (Clarkson
2004), the patent pooling phenomenon has received few scholarly treatments,
and most of those have been historical in nature. Vaughan (1925) describes
patent pool formation in the late 19th and early 20th century and examines a
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FIGURE 1. Growth of Nanotechnology Patents, 2000, 2002, 2004.
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number of early pools. Three examinations of the phenomenon have been in
the form of case studies. Cassady (1959) examines the formation and operation
of a patent pool by Thomas Edison that aggregated all of the important patents
for the early motion picture industry. Thompson (1987) describes the first
patent pool, which was formed in the 19th century around intellectual property
conflicts in the sewing machine industry. Bittlingmayer (1988) examines the
formation of an aircraft patent pool during World War I. While many scholars
have written favorably about patent pool formation (Vaughan 1925; Merges
1996, 1999; Newberg 2000), others have focused on potential competitive
problems posed by patent pools (Priest 1977; Taylor 1992; Carlson 1999).
A number of economists have recently written on patent pools. Both Choi
(2003) and Shapiro (2003) have examined patent pools in the context of patent
litigation settlements constrained by antitrust law. In a different article specif-
ically examining patent pools, Shapiro (2000) uses Cournot’s (1838) original
analysis of the “complements problem” to argue that patent pools raise wel-
fare when patents are perfect complements and harm welfare when they are
perfect substitutes. Work by Lerner and Tirole (2004) extends the analysis by
examining the strategic incentives to form a pool in the presence of current and
future innovations that are either substitutes for or complements to the patents
in the pool. Their model allows examination of the full range between the po-
lar cases of perfectly substitutable and perfectly complementary patents. Their
paper concludes that while much research remains to be done, the construction
of procompetitive pools is certainly possible. Stable pools can be formed by
clearly defining patent essentialness and by scrutinizing the economic incen-
tives provided to patent holders through pool membership versus independent
licensing.
Lerner and Tirole’s (2004) second paper on patent pools empirically exam-
ines the positive aspects of these arrangements, developing a set of theoretical
predictions concerning the pool structure. They predict how the attributes of
the pool vary with their key characteristics, such as the number of members
of the pool and the rate of technical advance in the industry. They sample 63
pools established between 1895 and 2001 from the dockets of court cases,
the archives of congressional hearings, and many other sources, to determine
the actual structure of the pooling agreements. Their study concludes that the
dynamics of management become more centralized as the pool grows larger.
As pool membership increases, third-party licensing becomes more common.
Such a finding is significant because restrictions on third-party licensing have
historically been a trigger for antitrust scrutiny.
Gilbert (2002) reviews the antitrust treatment of patent pooling over the
same time period and examines the factors that the courts identified as per-
tinent to the antitrust outcome. He concludes that until recently, the com-
petitive relationship of the patents was not a major determinant of the an-
titrust outcome in most cases. Instead, he suggests that the courts have
focused on restrictive licensing terms that affect downstream prices, although
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he argues that the competitive relationships between the patents should be
the most important factor in assessing the procompetitiveness of a given
pool.
Following Lerner et al.’s archival approach, Clarkson (2004) studied 101
patent pools that were at one time accused of antitrust violations by either the
Antitrust Division of the DOJ, the FTC, or private antitrust actions between
1900 and 1970. The analysis indicated that a primary determinant of pool
survival was an examination by the court of the existence of an underlying
patent thicket. Clarkson (2005), however, notes the problems associated with
a general lack of capability on the part of the antitrust regime to make an
objective determination of the existence of a patent thicket, and he proposes
such an objective measure based on patent thicket density.
Recent history also demonstrates the problematic nature of the antitrust
regime’s inability to objectively verify the existence of a patent thicket. On
June 26, 1997, the DOJ issued a Business Review letter indicating that a patent
pool based on MPEG-2, a technology standard for compactly representing
digital video and audio signals for consumer distribution, was deemed not
to be in violation of the antitrust laws of the United States. Less than a year
later, however, on March 24, 1998, the FTC filed a complaint against a patent
pool formed around photorefractive keratectomy (PRK), or laser eye surgery
technology, and ultimately forced the pool to dissolve. Although the two pools
had a number of similar characteristics, the antitrust regime gave its blessing to
the MPEG pool but destroyed the PRK pool. According to Newberg (2000), the
FTC litigation involving the PRK patent pool either ignored or failed to detect
the underlying laser eye surgery patent thicket and did not see that the PRK
pool was actually a procompetitive solution to the underlying patent thicket.
PATENT POOLS IN TWO CONVERGING TECHNOLOGIES
If patent pools in nanotechnology are to be a possible solution to nanotech-
nology patent thickets, they must be able to survive antitrust scrutiny. It is
therefore instructive to briefly examine the divergent fates of these two recent
patent pools involving the two best-established areas currently converging with
nanotechnology, namely information technology and biotechnology.
The MPEG pool involves technology for digitally coded representation of
moving pictures, audio, and their combination in compressed formats. The
MPEG working group responsible for developing the technology standard is
part of the International Telecommunication Union (ITU). Standard-setting
organizations like the ITU are cognizant of the potential problem of patent
thickets and have developed policies designed to prevent patent thickets from
thwarting the adoption of standards-based technologies. For example, the ITU’s
Patent Policy provides that the holder of any known patent or any pending
patent application related to any proposal made to the ITU in the process of
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standards-setting must submit a written statement, either waiving those patent
rights or committing to negotiate licenses for those rights on a nondiscrimina-
tory basis and on reasonable terms and conditions. Such licensing provisions
are often referred to as Reasonable and Nondiscriminatory, or RAND.
Although the MPEG-1 standard was developed in 1989, the patent thicket
challenges for the MPEG standards were not significantly addressed until after
the release of the draft MPEG-2 standard in 1993. Given that the set of patents
necessary to practice the MPEG-2 standard would come from a number of
firms, the potential problem of double marginalization (Viscusi et al. 2000)
had to be addressed in addition to the patent thicket issues,. As a result of
the activities of informal meetings in 1992 and 1993 regarding intellectual
property matters, a separate MPEG Intellectual Property Rights working group
(MPEG IPR) was formed to specifically address issues such as: (a) how to
identify which patent holders were willing to participate in this effort; (b) how
to know whether they own rights necessary for implementation of MPEG-2
core technology; and (c) how to establish the entity’s administrative structure
as an ongoing effort that works with new licensees and licensers, the licensing
structure, and the allocation of royalties.
Early on, the MPEG-2 community agreed on the need for an innovative
way to overcome the underlying patent thicket. Otherwise, the difficulty of
gaining access to a large enough body of the necessary MPEG-2 patents would
jeopardize the interoperability and implementation of digital video. Since any
licensing negotiations were left to the parties concerned and were performed
outside of the ITU standard setting process, several of the key companies
participating in the MPEG process were concerned that patent rights clearances
would be an issue.
Following a series of meetings held in 1993 and 1994, the MPEG IPR work-
ing group reached a consensus about the creation and operation of the pool,
and a licensing entity called MPEG LA was formed in order to administer the
patent pool for virtually all of the patents essential to the MPEG-2 standard.
While MPEG LA, did not have a track record of identifying essential patents,
it did have a detailed written document that described the requirements for im-
plementing the MPEG-2 standard. The IP Guidelines did not contain a working
definition of either essentialness or patent thickets, but MPEG LA developed
an objective third-party process that would prove not only the existence of a
patent thicket but could also define its boundaries in terms of an objective
determination of essentialness.
Another challenge facing MPEG LA was identifying the set of patents to
compare against the standard. While those in the MPEG-2 process would have
to abide by the RAND licensing policies required by the ITU standards bodies,
it was by no means certain that essential patents would be held only by those
participating in the standard setting process.
MPEG LA thus commissioned a massive study of the potentially relevant in-
tellectual property throughout the world. While the study involved examining
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more than 8000 US patent abstracts, more than 1000 US patents, and more
than 80 US patent prosecution histories, the prospects of getting potential pool
members to submit their MPEG-relevant patents for evaluation and poten-
tial inclusion involved a certain level of uncertainty. In the laser eye surgery
industry, however, the uncertainties were far more daunting.
Beginning in 1984, Dr. Charles Munnerlyn began to design an excimer laser
surgical system that could be used to perform clinical surgery on the human eye
without the use of scalpels or manually cutting the cornea. He partnered with a
company called VISX to develop a system for the new procedure, which they
called PRK. PRK showed tremendous promise for correcting nearsightedness
and astigmatism. One of the primary obstacles to bringing PRK to market,
however, was obtaining FDA approval. Because a PRK device would be a
medical device, VISX spent tens of millions of dollars on FDA-mandated
clinical trials, starting in 1987, before the FDA granted approval in 1996.
The commercialization of PRK by VISX faced another significant hurdle
in the form of intellectual property issues as additional firms were developing
laser refractive surgery devices, including Summit Technologies, which owned
patents that potentially blocked VISX from implementing a PRK device. Ac-
cording to Josh Newberg, at the time a litigator at the FTC,
With each of the firms vying for capital to finance the long lead time from
prototype, through clinical trials, to FDA approval, Summit and VISX had
to make educated guesses about the relative scope of each other’s patent
portfolios based on very limited information. The stakes were huge. If Summit
was found to have a blocking position over VISX, it could exclude VISX from
the marketplace altogether.7
In this instance the blocking situation was mutual, as VISX had patents
that blocked Summit from fully implementing a PRK device, and vice versa
(Newberg 2000). According to VISX CEO Mark Logan, the underlying patent
thicket was suffocating both firms and “neither firm could raise any money
without settling the patent issues.”8 While the patent thicket threatened to
thwart the development of laser eye surgery altogether, both firms were eager
to find a structure that would allow them to proceed with their FDA trials and
ultimately bring a PRK device to market.
To solve their patent thicket problem, VISX and Summit formed a patent
pool called Pillar Point Partners (P3) on June 3, 1992. Summit contributed 7
patents to the pool, and VISX contributed 18 patents. Collectively, these 25
patents contained more than 500 method and apparatus claims.
Having cleared the patent thicket for PRK for themselves, Summit and VISX
returned to the marketplace and then competed vigorously against each other,
including during the FDA clinical trial phase. Summit received FDA approval
7 Interview with Josh Newberg, March 9, 2004. Professor Newberg left the FTC after the VISX
litigation and is now a professor at the University of Maryland.
8 Interview with Mark Logan, July 1, 2003.
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in October of 1995, and VISX received FDA approval 5 months later. In the
ensuing months, both firms expanded the PRK market as competitors, but
they were soon challenged by the antitrust enforcement regime based on their
cooperative effort to clear the PRK patent thicket.
ANTITRUST REVIEW
Any organization concerned about potential antitrust issues has the right
to submit a proposed agreement or structure in advance to antitrust enforce-
ment officials for evaluation. At the DOJ this process is called the Business
Review Procedure.9 The FTC has a similar procedure for issuing Advisory
Opinions.10 Preparing a request for ex ante antitrust review is both cum-
bersome and expensive, and many smaller companies do not submit such
requests.
Given the troubled history of patent pools, the management of MPEG LA
was justifiably concerned about antitrust scrutiny. Fortunately, however, the
proposed MPEG-2 pool would be evaluated under the recently enacted pro-
visions of the IP Guidelines, which explicitly acknowledge that patent pools
may provide procompetitive benefits. Having crafted a structure as procom-
petitive as they thought possible, MPEG LA submitted its request for Business
Review on April 28, 1997.11 The DOJ issued a Business Review letter on
June 26, 1997, stating that it was “not presently inclined to initiate antitrust
enforcement action against the conduct”12 proposed by MPEG LA.
The DOJ began its formal analysis of the proposed patent pool with an in-
quiry into the validity of the patents and their relationship to each other, stating
that attempts to shield invalid or expired intellectual property rights would not
withstand antitrust scrutiny. Assuming that all of the patents to be included
in the pool were valid, and based on the representations of the complemen-
tary nature of those patents, the DOJ acknowledged that a package license for
patents in a patent thicket “can be an efficient and pro-competitive method of
disseminating those rights to would-be users.”13 In the case of MPEG, the DOJ
indicated that it viewed the pool as a procompetitive aggregation of intellectual
property. The DOJ’s comfort with that position was enhanced by the fact that
MPEG LA had used an independent expert to determine which patents were
essential to comply with the MPEG-2 standard, thus objectively defining the
boundaries of the underlying patent thicket.
The MPEG pool ultimately became the “gold standard” for patent pool
formation, and a number of subsequent patent pools were formed following the
9 28 C.F.R. § 50.6.
10 16 C.F.R. § 1.1 et sequation
11 Letter from Garrard Beeney to Joel Klein, April 28, 1997.
12 Letter from Joel Klein, June 26, 1997, available at http://www.gov/atr/public/busreview/1170.htm
13 Id.
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pattern set by MPEG. Each of those pools, however, was based on a standard.
The lack of patent pool formation outside of the standards-based context may
be due, in part, to the antitrust entanglements of the PRK pool, which did not
have the benefit of a standard to demonstrate the existence of an underlying
patent thicket.
Unlike MPEG LA, P3 did not submit its structure for antitrust review, and
almost exactly two years after VISX received FDA approval to begin selling
PRK devices in the United States, the FTC issued a complaint on March 24,
1998, alleging that Summit and VISX had violated the antitrust laws. The
FTC’s complaint contained several assumptions, however, which were core
to its argument. Contrary to the assertions of VISX and Summit, the FTC
disputed the existence of an underlying patent thicket. Critical to this position
was the FTC’s belief that the primary VISX patent was invalid, asserting that
it had been obtained fraudulently by withholding relevant information from
the PTO during prosecution. The FTC also implicitly assumed that VISX and
Summit were no longer competing aggressively because of the existence of
the P3 pool, despite the fact that the two firms were still competing with one
another in the sale or lease of PRK equipment.
The FTC sought an order requiring VISX and Summit to dissolve the patent
pool and prohibiting the firms from fixing the prices that doctors must pay to
use the firms’ PRK lasers. Faced with an aggressive and well-funded govern-
ment agency, neither VISX nor Summit was in a position to put up much of a
fight.
VISX and Summit settled with the FTC in August 1998, and agreed to
dissolve the pool. The FTC continued to allege that the VISX patent was
invalid, but VISX ultimately prevailed in a decision by an administrative law
judge in June of 1999. Despite the FTC’s initial allegations of fraud before
the PTO, VISX was further vindicated when the PTO issued a reexamination
certificate reaffirming the validity of the VISX patent in September 2000.
The FTC then reopened the case and dismissed the complaint altogether in
February 2001.
Could the PRK pool have been formed in such a way so as to survive antitrust
scrutiny? Given the erroneous position that the FTC took on the VISX patent,
the pool was likely doomed from the start. The approach taken by the FTC,
however, is still subject to criticism, as many of the assumptions upon which
it based its initial actions were shown to be suspect (Newberg 2000), which
raises the question as to whether the FTC action was ultimately in the public
interest.
Carl Shapiro (2000) raises two particularly thorny issues regarding patent
thickets in analyzing the VISX and Summit result. First, if the two firms rea-
sonably believed that their respective patent portfolios blocked each other
at the time they formed the pool, was such a belief sufficient to jus-
tify the formation of a pool? How hard were they required to look into
the validity of each other’s patent claims before agreeing to form the P3
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pool? Second, assuming that each firm believed it could work around the
other’s patents, would forcing them to do so ultimately benefit the con-
sumer? Shapiro also questions the FTC’s insistence that a cross-license was
a superior alternative to a patent pool, as any new entrant would have
to negotiate two separate licenses in order to access the necessary PRK
patents.
When comparing the MPEG and PRK pools, Newberg (2000) suggests that
certain differences may have been a function of their respective industries. In
examining the MPEG pool, Newberg notes that the pool members are huge
firms with enormous resources whose main business is not the licensing of
these pooled patents, but rather, the manufacture and sale of telecommunica-
tions and consumer electronics hardware.
In contrast, Newberg points out that VISX and Summit were small start-up
companies that were trying to create a completely new industry based on a tech-
nological innovation. They faced a capital-intensive technology, a long product
development cycle, massive regulatory barriers, and potentially ruinous patent
infringement litigation. For Summit and VISX, the laser refractive surgery
business was the only business, and a single adverse patent ruling—or even
the perception of vulnerability to adverse patent rulings—could dry up their
capital and put them out of business (Newberg 2000, p. 28).
Newberg also justifies their license fee arrangement, noting that instead of
trying to recover their capital investment by charging high machine prices,
VISX and Summit presented the marketplace with a substantially lower ma-
chine acquisition cost compared to the actual cost of the machine. To make
up for the lower revenues from machine sales, Newberg argues that VISX and
Summit were justified in using the per-procedure fee as a kind of metering
device, “the more the machines were used, the more money Summit and VISX
would make in procedure fees” (Newberg 2000, p. 28). Newberg also identifies
the benefit of using “the pooling arrangement to reduce the risk of [patent]
litigation, while continuing to compete on machine sales, and also as a way of
hedging the risk that one firm would receive FDA approval later, or perhaps
not at all” (p. 28).
Although neither the DOJ nor the FTC specifically made an assessment of
the existence or nonexistence of an underlying patent thicket, the DOJ was able
to assume the existence of a thicket based on the procedures put forward by
MPEG that were designed to evaluate the essentialness of patents submitted
for pool inclusion.
Given the reliance on a standard for the determination of essentialness, the
DOJ’s assumption was a safe one. In the case of PRK pool, however, the FTC
appears to have incorrectly assumed that no thicket existed and proceeded
accordingly.
The MPEG and PRK pools were similar in many respects. They were both
formed around emerging technologies in order to facilitate adoption of those
technologies. They were also both formed around a collection of blocking and
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complementary patents. Ultimately, the MPEG patent pool appears to have
survived the antitrust examination for two primary reasons. First, MPEG ap-
pears to have specifically crafted their pooling agreements in order to avoid
antitrust problems using the IP Guidelines. Second, and certainly equally im-
portant, MPEG LA was able to develop an objective process that demonstrated
the existence of a thicket coincident with the proposed pool.
NANOPOOLS AS A POSSIBLE SOLUTION
TO PATENT THICKETS
A firm with a nanotechnology patent that finds itself enmeshed in a patent
thicket has a number of strategic options. It can sue anyone that it finds that
may be potentially infringing its patent, but if it attempts to commercialize its
patent, either it or its potential licensees face the same litigation risk from other
nanotechnology patent holders. In addition, bringing a patent infringement
action in court is expensive. According to the American Intellectual Property
Law Association, the median cost for a patent litigation can often exceed
$2 million and easily reach $4 million (AIPLA 2003). Particularly for startup
firms, such costs could be prohibitive.
An alternative strategy would be for nanotechnology patent holders to form
a patent pool, both clearing the nanothicket for that technology and facilitating
“one-stop technology platform licensing” (Horn 2003). Such arrangements
avoid the problems of double-marginalization and economic holdup by essen-
tial patent holders, and in the case of pools based on standards, have survived
antitrust scrutiny.
The American National Standards Institute’s Nanotechnology Standards
Panel (ANSI-NSP) was established by ANSI in August 2004 in order for the
major institutions with a stake in the nanotechnology industry to come together
and work toward establishing a set of standards.14 The goal of ANSI-NSP is to
coordinate the agreement of such standards as nomenclature/terminology with
which to communicate, as well as materials properties and measurement proce-
dures to facilitate the commercialization of the variety of uses and applications
of nanotechnology. As with the MPEG pool and similar standards-based pools
such as IEE-1394 (Firewire) and DVDs, the standards document itself can
provide ample guidance as to which patents are essential and thus should be
included in the pool.
The standards-setting process for nanotechnology is in its infancy, however,
and the prospects for the development of standards remain uncertain. Even if
ANSI-NSP can develop some standards, there may be nanothickets for which
14 American National Standards Institute. “About the Nanotechnology Standards Panel.” Avail-
able at http://www.ansi.org/standards˙activities/standards˙boards˙panels/nsp/overview.aspx. Accessed
January 8, 2006.
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standards have yet to be developed. In these areas, an alternate strategy would
be needed to form a nanopool, but in the absence of a standard, extreme care
should be exercised to avoid antitrust entanglements.
Nanothickets are growing, and firms will be forced to develop strategic
responses. Whether nanopools are formed using standards or reference models,
the nanopooling strategy provides a mechanism for clearing the nanothickets
and bringing nanotechnology-based products to the marketplace.
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